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The idea of the late development effect is due perhaps originally to the
historian Gerschenkron's study of the role of state intervention in the
economy and the large size of manufacturing units (in a few late
developing countries). In this paper I am concerned with Professor
Dore's development of this idea as an explanatory device for societal
evolution, especially as it deals with the subject called 'industrial
relations'. The basic idea of the late development effect, namely that
the late developer has the latest technology to borrow from the West
and that he does so, has been extended by Dore to 'social technology'.
'The late starter begins with advanced production technology. He is also
likely to start with advanced organizational technology'. (Dore British
Factory - Japanese Factory 1973, p.414). Further, because the late
developer buys the latest social technology package and incorporates it
into his social fabric at the crucial time of the change from a
pre.-industrial society to an industrial one, the latest social technology
helps 'gel' the developed industrial society of a late developer into a
mould of particular social relationships.
Thus 'the bigger the organizational leap; the more likely industry is to
begin with rationalized bureaucratic forms of organization, including
specialist pçrsonnel managers operating objective recruitment and
promotion schemes - the more so if, as is likely, the state plays a direct
role in the industrialization process through state corporations or
partnership schemes.' (Ibid p. 416).
Further, the process of transfer of social technology is by diffusion and
not by a process of struggles and interactions within the country. Thus
(the Late Development effect postulates that) 'the more the norms
diffused to the late starter from the industrialized countries are likely
to stress the right of trade unions and workers and the need to treat
workers as human beings not as mere sellers of commodity called labour.
* Susantha Goonatilake was Research Officer at the Institute of Development
Studies from October 1973 to October 1974.
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Corporations in the contemporary late-starter countries, sending their
personnel officers to business schools in Europe and America, begin
industrialization under the influence of human relations theories and
Y-theorjes', and theories about the virtues of consultation with
workshop representatives.'
This process of transfer is carried (in the case of the pre-career
qualification patterns in recruitment) by 'manpower planning advisers
from the developed countries' (Dore The Late Development Effect
1972, p. 7), by professional associations and in the case of the
establishment of trade unions by such organizations as the ILO (ibid p.
10).
Put in such terms, the transfer of social technology has interesting
repercussions on the social configurations of late developers Just as,
after a late start, both West Germany and Japan could buy the latest
technology and beat the other industrialized nations and so be models
for the latter, so the buyers of the latest 'social technology' likewise
provide a model for the early starters. Thus the model for the social
future of Britain lies not in present-day America (as was posited a few
decades ago) but in Japan, a late starter. On this logic it lies not only
with Japan, which is a relatively early late starter, but also with Mexico,
a middla late starter, with Sri Lanka, a later starter, and also with
Senegal, a late late starter. In this model, presumably the latest starter
provides the social model for Britain in the distant future while the
early late starter provides the model for the relatively near future. Thus
the late development effect is in a sense a convergence theory. In fact,
it is the usual convergence theory stood on its head; in this scheme, the
early starters converge towards the late starters' social profile. (Dore,
1973, p. 419).
This simple transfer of 'social technology' in this scheme is (in Dore's
view) however, tempered by local exigencies; and diversities like the
different pre-industrial histories of different countries affect the final
shape of the emergent society. Even so, it is the transferred 'social
1 To put it somewhat crudely Y theories of personnel management are those that
emphasize the potential for growth in humans as a motivator as opposed to X
theories which depend on the more traditional 'carrot and stick' systems of
motivation.
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technology' that is more important. Otherwise, if the local component
overwhelmed the imported one, there would be no 'late development
effect', that is, no significant transfer of social technology.
Some logical consequences of the concept and the four assumptions on
which it rests
I have sketched, albeit in a simplified form, the basic idea of the Laie
Development effect. There are inherent in the idea many logical
difficulties and ethnocentric assumptions. In discussing the logical
difficulties below I hope to argue within the logic of the Late
Development effect argument. That is, I assume it to be true and follow
some of its logical consequences. 1 will take five countries: Britain (as
the self-starter), Japan, Mexico, Sri Lanka and Senegal in their order of
respective starts of industrialization.
According to the model, Japan, the late starter, is the model for Britain.
Let us assume that Britain catches up with Japan's social technology
and achieves social technological parity. We will hypothetically assume
that she does so in 1980. Having reached parity, now what? Do both
Britain and Japan now start thinking of catching up with Mexico, a
later starter - that is do both Britain andJapan together become
socially atrophied states that look for new dynamism from Mexico?
And, similarly, when Britain andJapan have caught up with Mexico, do
these three now run after Sri Lanka? On the basis of this scenario a
'goal state' is reached when all the starters have caught up with each
other, and they have no more states to catch up with.
Now, this model of social technology is based firstly on a strong
ethnocentric base, namely that there is one-way technological transfer
to the later developers, presumably from the earliest starter.2 The
model does not assume that there is any significant transfer of the
2 It is possible that by the 'early starter' one does not necessarily have to mean a
single country like Britain. It could mean in the case of management technology for
instance the existence of an 'increasingly cohesive international professional group
of leading management experts having similar views in say the UK, US and Italy
with the same consultancy firms operating in all of them'. In such a case the role of
the 'international professional groups' is very similar to the role of the
multinational corporation today, not centred on any particular country but
carrying the same imperialist role of an earlier age, namely operating on the rest of
the world from a Western base.
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indigeneous thought from say Japan to Britain, or from Mexico, Sri
Lanka or Senegal to Britain, etc. And secondly it is assumed that the
social technology which is transmitted is of only one type, that is,
there are no competing social technologies that could be transmitted to
the receiver. The implication is that even if the one-way transfer is
assumed, two receivers may end up with two different social
configurations, depending on two different social technologies
borrowed. Given such a multiplicity of social technologies, the model is
not very predictive, and aliows for many possibilities.
A third assumption of the model is that not only is there an
ethnocentric one-way transfer of one social ideology at a time, but that
this social ideology must remain unchanged. Why this is so can be seen
by the sequence below.
Suppose social technology St1 (e.g. Victorian predictability in social
relations) is introduced to late developing country L1 and the early
starter E catches up with L1 but E in the meantime changes its social
technology which it wants to transfer to St2 (e.g. anarchistic
counter-culture) so that now the second late developer L2 has two
possibilities: either of adopting the original package St1 or the later
St2.
Thus if L2 adopts St2, then E and L1 have to aspire for this as early
starters, whereas if L2 adopts St1 then E and L1 remain at the St1
stage. Again, as in the earlier case of multiple social technologies
available for borrowing, changing social ideology3 (St1, St2, etc.) in the
early starter gives rise to multiple possibilities of final outcomes and
convergence does not occur. This means the assumption of a
conservative ideology and society is essential for the system to work.
A fourth assumption of the model is that the local component of the
lt is possible as an abstract exercise conceptually to separate social technology
from social ideology, to refer to the former as for example the notion of having a
specific role called 'personnel manager' as separate from values and ideology. But this
is a false dichotomy. The prevailing managerial ideology (say in the 1950s)
produced a particular 'technology' (including personnel managers and 'human
relations'), as a concrete response to certain pressures from unions etc. (See, for
instance, Bendix 1963).
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social technology - which is added by the receiver - should be small in
comparison with what is got from the sender. That is, the Japanese (or
Mexican, Sri Lankan or Senegalese) social technology that is added
should not overwhelm the British implanted one, the former should
play a subservient role. If the local cultural element is the stronger one,
then the whole late development effect transfer idea becomes
inoperative.
lt is seen that the four conditions under which the late development
effect works are very restrictive and, if applicable at all, only under very
special conditions. We will now study the degree to which it is
restrictive and to illustrate the limitation we will first look at the
transfer possibilities of hard technology as opposed to social
technology, as this is relatively easier to discuss. We will take the four
assumptions we have discussed above one by one.
Logical consequences in (hard) technology transfer and the four
assumptions
First, the assumption that (hard) technology flows only from Britain
and the general Western area of influence is no longer true. For any
latecomer today, a vast spectrum of technology is available from many
industrialized countries (America, Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, etc.)
as well as increasingly from late starters themselves (India, China, etc.)
so that any hard technology transfer allows for many sources for
potential borrowers.
Secondly, even in the case of Britain the type of technology that is
transferred is not one but many. To list a few possible classifications:
categories of craft technology, machine tending technology, assembly
line technology and continuous process production; or categories of
small batch and unit production; large batch and mass production and
process production. There are other classifications possible, for instance
the now fashionable Schumacher classification of the £100 work place
(intermediate technology) and the £1,000 work place (high
technology).
Looking at the third assumption of an unchanging conservative hard
technology in the case of the early starter, it is seen that this is absurd
for hard technology. The spiralling exponential growth in the physical
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sciences and technological knowledge (doubling every seven years)
makes this point very vividly.
The fourth point that the local technology should be always subservient
to the imported one is also under question, especially in view of current
arguments about industrialization in the Third World. Intermediate
technology, the Chinese concept of 'walking on two legs', are all
possibilities of the potential role for lower level technologies.
If these assumptions appear invalid in the case of hard technology, they
do even more so in the case of social technology. Technology is, at least
at a first level of approximation, to a certain extent value and
social-context free, but social technology is value laden, it has deep
political and moral overtones.
Problems in transfer of social technology
Thus the first assumption of a one-way early starter-late starter transfer
of social technology is essentially an imperialist's view of the world. lt
assumes that the early starter, Britain, generates all relevant social
comment on the shape of the social (and in our case the organizational)
world. This was basically true in, say, the nineteenth century, when
Britain could impose its will and see that the ideology of its ruling
classes prevailed (or alternatively peddle it as the fashionable and latest
mo del4 to subject peoples both within its shores as well as outside).
Coming to more modern times where coercive and straight
demonstration effects of an earlier age are not strictly possible, the
straight transfer model breaks down. There are many countries to
choose from, e.g. the Soviet Union,, China, Norway. Not only are there
many national 'prototypes' to choose from, but there are definite flows
from the late developers to the early developers. An interesting case is
what is now happening to Theory 'Y' (an example of social technology
transfers given by Dore).
Theory 'Y' was built by McGregor on the basic assumptions of
Maslow's model of a hierarchy of needs (see McGregor 1957, p. 27) and
is strongly related to the latter's ideas of self-actualization. Now the
Or, to change the metaphor, as the 'civilized' or 'Christian' model.
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concept of self-actualization, as well as those associated concepts of
'meta-motivation' and 'will-to-meaning' which have recently been
developed within this broad framework of thinking, has led to a new
psychology (humanistic or third stream psychology) which is
challenging both the Freudian as well as behavioural (Pavlov-Skinner)
approaches. This psychology is having an increasing influence on the
managerial ideology in Western organizations and on the training and
personnel literature of organizations.
Now one of the interesting features of this new organizational
technology is that not only are there similarities between concepts like
'meta-motivation', and the 'will-to-meaning' and 'self-actualization' and
Eastern (meaning Hindu-Buddhistic) concepts but there is now a direct
transfer of such concepts from the late developers (the East) to the
early developers (the West). Thus Maslow's last works use straight
Buddhist terminology and concepts (e.g. 'high Nirvana', 'low Nirvana',
'Buddhisatva', 'Pratyekhabuddha', appear in Maslow 1968, pp. 110,
119) and Maslow asserts simply that 'the new psychology is also in the
Eastern tradition'.
One of the new (that is last ten years or so) developments in the
organizational psychology field is the growth of various techniques like
sensitivity training, T-groups and encounter groups. One of the fountain
heads of theory for these techniques in group theory is the new
humanistic psychology referred to above. Not only does this
psychology find empathy with much Eastern thought but recently
many groups have begun to use almost direct Eastern techniques and
approaches in sensitivity training. Thus Lawrence (1971) and Burton
(1970) have used straight Buddhist meditation techniques and
approaches respectively. Jackson (1973) for instance, surveying the
T-group scene in Britain, reported the rapid swing towards yoga and zen.
The leading practitioner in Britain, Quaesitor, not only has adopted
eastern techniques but its two founder directors have donned saffron
rohes. The other leading group in Britain, Kaleidoscope, is similarly
offering courses with an eastern bent. Thus in the case of the
transfer of managerial ideology in the context of the 1970s, we see at
least thc beginning of a reversal of the one-way flows of the colonial,
imperialist era.
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The preceding remarks apply to managerial ideology but this does not
of course detract from the fact that there is still an attempt at transfer
of straight Western organization knowledge through business schools.
Foreign business school qualifications are much valued by elite
managerial groups within dependent countries. Yet there has been in
academic circles within the last ten years much criticism of the
relevance and uses of such transfers, and constant observation is that
what is learned at these business schools is never practised in home
countries.5 The relevance of transferred managerial technology has
been the subject of deep questioning, and two sub-disciplines have
grown up covering this field, namely that of 'Comparative
Administration' and 'Cross-cultural management research'. These
groups in comparative management not only are concerned with
relevance but are also potentially a forum for cross-fertilization of
national managerial experiences. Thus they provide (at least in theory)
a source for transfer of managerial technology arising from a multiple
flow of ideas between at least some nations, late and early starters and
not only from the early starters
We have been talking so far of the possibilities of one-way transfers of
managerial ideology. This transfer occurs relatively peacefully due to
demonstration effects, the prestige of Western centres of ideology
creation etc., because the reference groups of the managerial class in
most ex-colonies is in the West. But peaceful 'transfers' of the ideology
of working class movements have never occurred in this fashion. They
have never been accepted as legitimate by management by virtue of the
fact that they were 'norms diffused to the late starters from the
industrialized countries' stressing. . . 'the rights of trade unions and
workers' (Dore 1973 p. 416) and, certainly, rarely to a significant
degree through agencies like the ILO. When attempts at diffusion of
certain ideas from the West have been made by trade unionists in the
non-West (that is, where they have attempted to increase class soudant'
beyond limits set by the ruling class) they have been almost invariably
opposed by the managerial class, either by direct confrontation or by
strategems of 'buying off'. (For documented examples in Japan and Sri
Lanka, see Yoshino 1968 and Sarvaloganayagam 1973).
A case study by the present writer (Goonatilake 1971) of a Ceylon industrial
plant revealed that a continued indoctrination in Western techniques over ten years
had had no significant effect on the actual behaviour of managers. (Ibid chapter 5,
also appendix 1).
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The concept of a model of a simple transfer of working class ideology
that is accepted by management is simply not realistic. Such transfers
are allowed to take place peacefully ('diffusion of norms') and are
legitimised by management only if they agree with the preconceptions
of the ruling strata. If by any chance such transfers take place as a
transfer of an ideology of conflict, which they do, they are subject to
suppression. In this one has properly to assess the role of, say, the ILO
itself - a significant transfer agency in the Dore model as a product
of social and historical forces and professing an ideology of its own,
presumably strongly influenced by American ideology. (Note for
instance the decision to cut off funds to the ILO by George Meany, the
well known American labour 'leader', Vietnam hawk and one-time
Nixon buddy).
This brings us to the second assumption of the logic of the late
development effect model, namely that not only is there principally a
one-way transfer here from early to late starter, but that what is
transferred is only one set of values, one package of ideology. Britain,
the early starter (and the social climate within it) has within the last
two turbulent centuries produced or taken part in the creation of a
variety of social ideologies. To name a few at random, social
Darwinism, communism, liberalism etc. In fact many of the 'isms' and
their various tributaries were active in intellectual circles in Britain. The
late development effect model rests on the assumption that generally
only one6 of these packages was transmitted to and accepted by late
starters, a further underlying assumption here being that what was
transmitted was only the ruling ideology. These 'late developing
countries' which have imported ideologies apart from the ruling one
and have successfully industrialized are precisely those which are left
out of the model. These countries are the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe
and China.
The third assumption on which the logic of the late development effect
model rests, namely that the social technology that is transmitted
remains constant, is basically a conservative ideology, in that it assumes
6 If two or three contradictory packages were transmitted and available for
acceptance by the later starter, then the idea of the late development effect breaks
down. If the recipient is free to choose his social technology, then the concept of
universality of social packages on which the theory rests breaks down.
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a no-change status for the West - a once and for all development. In
the wide sense of the term 'conservative' as an ideology of the ruling
strata, we have seen that the restriction to only one social technology
transfer (and that of a particular managerial ideology) at a time, is in
this sense conservative. By limiting itself to oniy one transfer in time
(that is, in the case of the organization studies, to a moment in history
when a modus vivendi of a specific kind was arrived at between class
forces in the West) the late development effect becomes doubly
conservative.
A further and véry significant point in the Dore model is that what are
assumed to be the latest organizational technologies are in the context
of the 1970s not necessarily the latest, but those arising from the
organizational concepts of the 1950s and early 1960s. The 'advanced
organizational technology' (Dore 1973, p. 414) that is referred to is
'rationalized, bureaucratic forms of organization' (p. 416) of the
Weberian type. Now, one of the recurring themes in the organization
literature of the last decade or so has been the reporting of the collapse
of the bureaucratic forms of organization and methods of search for
alternatives.
Not only has there been much work to show that in the context of
today's social environment in the West (high degree of awareness and
militancy among workers, a high degree of change in the society, etc.)
bureaucratic organizations do not function, but also that bureaucratic
organizations are not efficient. The search for efficient organizational
forms to replace the bureaucratic ones has given rise to many
organizational forms ('organic', 'loosely structered', with 'high degree of
autonomy', 'matrix type' etc.) that are often reminiscent of
pre-industriâl organizational forms. In fact, even motivation patterns
reminiscent of pre-industrial ones (for instance the concept of the
'polyvalent craftsmen') are being reintroduced. (For detailed treatment
of this see Goonatilake 1973 pp. 333-407).
In this context not only is the Dore transfer model using a very
restrictive use of the word 'latest technology' but it is also ignoring the
fact that if what one requires is actually copying the latest fashionable
technology, then the best form of copying is retaining large chunks of
their existing technology, as these now constitute the latest. (For
47
example under this argument late developers should not opt for the
Western concept of tightly scheduled time in their factories but should
opt for 'flexitime' which, apart from being the latest has similarities to
the peasant concept of time).
The fourth assumption of the logic of the Dore model is that the
imported social technology should always override the existing local
one. This is again an imperialistic concept, which, even in the case of
Japan, is subject to question.. Many writers on Japanese organizations
have emphazised the fact that although a concerted effort had been
made to transfer concepts such as 'Scientific Management', they were
always absorbed, only if found to be consonant with local norms. Thus
absorption of the imported technology is by no means a foregone
conclusion. This assumption is similar to that of the 'modernization'
theories of the 1950s. In fact, in the case of many South Asian
countries, the breakdown of the 'modernization' theories has led to the
concept of post-traditional societies where the late developer
incorporates much of its earlier 'social technology'.
In the discussion above I have attempted to see how the four
assumptions on which the logic of the late development effect concept
rests are related to reality. I believe I have demonstrated that the
assumptions, and hence the model, have only a very tenuous link with
reality.
A further doubtful aspect of the theory exists apart from its validity.
Since the late development effect assumes a one-way flow of ideology
and technology, either by diffusion or imitation, it assumes also static
relationships of dependence and dominance between source and
destination. A theory which assumes dominance
- ideological,
technological or cultural - as part of its structure of exploration, tends
to legitimize the fact of dominance and helps to perpetuate it. Cultural
domination of the non-West by the West arose out of the bonds of
colonialism and is literally a colonialism of the mind. Thus acceptance
of a theory like the late development effect has the necessary
consequence of continuing this colonialism of the mind.
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